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income seems to be the most important de-
terminant of HCE expenditures. The income 
elasticity of demand has been estimated to be 
close to unity. These results were later repli-
cated for panel data [8] and similar results 
appeared. In addition to this relationship, the 
institutional arrangements, health care pri-
ces, technology and its advances and hospi-
tal structures of health care systems should 
have an impact on health expenditures for 
health policy to be effective in this context, 
but they resulted much smaller in scale [8]. 
These studies were however limited by small 
sample size, supplier induced demand, omit-
ted variables and the implicit assumption of 
homogenous effects of explanatory variables 
across countries.
On the other hand the health care country 
studies with panel data have most often con-
INTRODUCTION
Health policy and health systems are desig-
ned to deliver health services to provide for 
the general population’s health needs. These 
create health benefits (increases in longevity, 
QALY and decreases in Pyll and amendable 
morbidity etc. population health gains) and 
costs in form of national health care expendi-
tures (HCEs). In the demand for health model, 
inputs (staff, capital, intangible assets, etc.) 
are turned into intermediate outputs (doctor 
visits, hospital days, examinations and tests, 
etc.) according to the production function of 
health. Health (utility) effects are the final 
outputs or results of this process [1,2].
There has been quite a considerable number 
and amount of research effort on cross-count-
ry studies with cross-sectional data [3-7]. The 
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ABSTRACT
The incentives of health care expenditure (HCE) have been a topic of discussion in the USA (Obama reforms) and in 
Europe (adjustment to debt crisis). There are competing views of institutional versus GDP (unit income elasticity) and 
productivity related factors of growth of expenditure. However ageing of populations, technology change and economic 
incentives related to institutions are also key drivers of growth according to the OECD and EU’s AWG committee. Simula-
tion models have been developed to forecast the growth of social expenditure (including HCEs) to 2050. In this article we 
take a historical perspective to look at the institutional structures and their relationship to HCE growth. When controlling 
for age structure, price developments, doctor density and in-patient and public shares of expenditures, we find that fee-for-
service in primary care, is according to the results, in at least 20 percent more costly than capitation or salary remuneration. 
Capitation and salary (or wage) remuneration are at same cost levels in primary care. However we did not find the cost 
lowering effect for gatekeeping which could have been expected based on previous literature. Global budgeting 30 (partly 
DRG based) percent less costly in specialized care than other reimbursement schemes like open contracting or volume ba-
sed reimbursement. However the public integration of purchaser and provider cost seems to result to about 20 higher than 
public reimbursement or public contracting. Increasing the number of doctors or public financing share results in increased 
HCEs. Therefore expanding public reimbursement share of health services seems to lead to higher HCE. On the contrary, 
the in-patient share reduced expenditures. Compared to the previous literature, the finding on institutional dummies is 
in line with similar modeling papers. However the results for public expansion of services is a contrary one to previous 
works on the subject. The median lag length of adjustment is 6.6 years or 26 quarters for countries to move half way to the 
eventual equilibrium in HCE/GDP-ratios in response to a shock in demand factors which indicates “hysteresis” in demand.
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centrated on co-integration and unit root stu-
dies for intra-country or cross-country time 
series data of HCE, GDP and their statistical 
interaction. Results on the relationship of co-
integration between HCE and GDP are quite 
mixed (for full discussion see [9]. Some stu-
dies seem to find unit roots in HCE and GDP 
time series with varying findings (yes or no) 
of a co-integration vector present between 
the two [10,11] but these were quickly rever-
sed by contradictory evidence with different 
test methods declaring no unit roots [12]. The 
same seems to apply to co-integration consi-
derations [12]. The power of co-integration 
and unit root tests and their general test de-
sign seem to greatly influence results ma-
king consensus of co-integration time series, 
cross-country analysis of income elasticity 
of health care demand seemingly very diffi-
cult. One of the latest study by Dreger [13] 
using latest co-integration techniques find 
that a co-integration vector exist and that the 
income elasticity of health expenditures is 
unity (equal to one) and this result is robust 
to statistical testing and different model spe-
cification. The other explanatory variables 
controlled are medical progress, life expec-
tancy, infant mortality and share of old age 
population [13].
However there is less literature on health care 
system characteristics on health care costs 
done with long panels and flexible nonli-
near models. This paper aims at bringing a 
significant contribution to this field of study 
following the study on effects of institutional 
variables on HCEs as introduced and estima-
ted by Gerdtham et al. [9,14,15]. Many of 
the key research questions here are similar 
to thhose that can be found in Gerdtham et 
al. [9]. The difference here is that the ratio of 
HCE to GDP is the dependent variable not 
HCE in itself and the estimation method is 
nonlinear due to partial adjustment of expen-
ditures.
As a sketch and short preliminary motiva-
tion for our analysis one can use Figure 1, 
according to which it seems that the level of 
health care spending is lower in publicly fi-
nanced systems. The countries are grouped 
so that five year intervals from 1975 to 2005 
are used and aggregation into country groups 
are formed based on OECD’s recent working 
paper on system characteristics [9,16]. In Fi-
gure 2, the relationship between public fun-
ding and health care GDP share is plotted by 
five year intervals in a scatter diagram. This 
is an illustrative and descriptive sketch of 
the situation in which countries are strongly 
divided by financing source, financing form 
and service delivery into more public or more 
private systems. The correlation coefficient 
in the chart is quite high (r = -0,6, r-squared 
= 0.36).
As a general rule, health care systems can be 
divided into three broad categories by system 
type [9,14,15]:
 - category 1 consists of public systems 
(both financing and services);
 - category 2 consists of mixed systems (ei-
ther financing or services private);
 - category 3: market based systems (pri-
vately funded and private service provi-
ders).
When we talk of public finance we mean 
state, local authority or social insurance fun-
ding of services that are financed by taxes or 
compulsory health or social insurance. Pri-
vate funding is by out-of-pocket payments, 
private insurance policies and other of such 
arrangements. A more detailed description of 
OECD countries health system institutional 
characteristics is given in Gerdtham and Pa-
ris [9,16], and we use this system to classify 
the countries into the three categories listed 
above and further into country groups for the 
regression analysis.
Public production of services can be organi-
zed and produced by the state or local autho-
rity (or third sector) level with the require-
ment that it is non-profit and strictly regulated 
by legislation on service production. Private 
services on the other hand are for-profit and 
less regulated. However the boundaries are 
not always easy to find and there are public-
private mix in-between service forms [17]. 
Specific criteria on system dummy variables 
Figure 1. Percent of health care expenditure by public financing and total 
health care expenditure (HCE) in selected OECD countries 1975-2005 (% of 
GDP).Source: OECD Health Data 2007, OECD. Western Europe (EUR): the 
Netherlands, France and Spain. Nordic countries (NORDIC): Norway, Sweden, 
Denmark (country group averages) [17]
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applied to data can be found in Gerdtham 
[9,14,16].
The health care sector in Europe is mostly 
publicly funded and financed, in contrast to 
other countries across the Atlantic and Paci-
fic. For example in Finland the public sector 
accounts for 77 percent of health care fun-
ding and in other Nordic countries the share 
is roughly 85 percent. In contrast the corre-
sponding public shares are 62 percent in the 
Netherlands, 59 percent in Switzerland and 
45 percent in the USA in 2005. These figu-
res have changed since then so that the th-
ree countries (NL, SUI, USA) have come 
closer or even above the 50-50 ratio public 
and private mix with public share increasing 
in 2010 [18]. The movement has been rapid 
from private to public financing schemes. In 
the Netherlands the development towards pu-
blic financing has been most rapid [16,18]. 
An example of this is The Affordable Care 
Act enacted in 2011-2012 that will get about 
30 million people to compulsory insurance 
in the USA (http://www.healthcare.gov/law/
index.html).
Financial incentives and institutions play a 
key role in determining health care expendi-
tures [7,15,19]. The financing is through taxes 
and service provision by public hospitals and 
health centers in the Nordic countries. The 
Nordic countries health care, together with 
the UK, are called public integrated systems 
[9]. In contrast the corresponding public sha-
res are close to or below 50 percent with fi-
nance through reimbursement and insurance 
policies in the Netherlands, in Switzerland, 
and especially in the USA. In all these latter 
three countries the systems are still in many 
respects private insurance based and services 
are provided by private hospitals and clinics. 
However the Medicaid and Medicare pro-
grams for the lower socio-economic persons 
and older people in the US are publicly finan-
ced (mixed reimbursement).
According to Paris et al. and Gerdtham et al. 
[9,16] we can classify health systems based 
on their public-private mix, financing source, 
financial incentives and service delivery. This 
defines Nordic versus Netherlands, Switzer-
land and USA as two study groups with the 
third consisting of UK, Spain and France. 
Using the three categories based on OECD 
classification we roughly divide the countries 
into the following groups [16]:
1. Finland, Denmark, Sweden, France the 
UK and Spain;
2. The Netherlands; 
3. The United States and Switzerland.
Figure 2 depicts the rapid growth of health 
care cost as a share of GDP in selected 
OECD-countries and country groups from 
1975 to 2005. It is essential to note the rising 
trend that is presented in each of the groups 
(Finland is the author’s home country and for 
domestic point of view reasons separated 
from the other Nordic countries). This means 
that an increasing fraction of the national 
economy’s resources have been devoted to 
health and health care over the past three de-
cades [17]. For example, the level of health 
spending was roughly 10 percent in OECD 
countries, 9 percent in the Nordic countries 
and 8 percent in Finland in 2007. These figu-
res have been rather stable for the past five 
Figure 2. Total health care expenditure (HCE) in selected OECD countries 1975-2005 and country groups (% of GDP). Source: 
OECD Health Data 2007, OECD. Western Europe (EUR): the Netherlands, France and Spain. Nordic countries (NORDIC): Norway, 
Sweden, Denmark (country group averages) [17]
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of the adult population are evident only in 
the long run in the form of lower morbidity, 
sickness and disability. Growing attention is 
paid to the reduction in socio-economic he-
alth differences. The National Institute for 
Health and Welfare (THL) estimated in 2007 
that morbidity, sickness and disability are 
the cause of half a million potential working 
years lost and related to 5 to 6 billion Euros 
or about a third of national health care costs 
(in 1995 prices) [22]. The impact of the ha-
bit related diseases (smoking, alcohol abuse, 
lack of exercise) on health care costs is esti-
mated to be one billion Euros annually. 
Some key health indicators and their chan-
ges are shown for the Nordic countries in 
Figure 3.
The key to understanding Figure 3 is looking 
at the differently shaded areas within countri-
es not the totals of country “basement-roof” 
graphs as a whole. Those areas under the 
0-line are possible reduction in morbidity 
and mortality (not necessarily negative deve-
lopments in general health status). For exam-
ple in Finland cerebrovascular diseases have 
decreased by roughly 20 percent, alcohol 
consumption has increased by 20 percent and 
overweight population by roughly 10 percent 
(adding up these doesn’t make sense). No 
adding up style cross-country comparisons 
should be drawn from this figure although the 
development of chosen health has been quite 
similar in all Nordic countries.
RESEARCH AGENDA
The model variables (both endogenous and 
exogenous) used in this article are based on 
the previous work and articles by Gerdtham 
et al. [9,14,15] on health care expenditure in 
OECD-countries. Our focus is on reporting 
the effects of system characteristic variables 
on HCEs. The estimation plan is to estimate 
a static model by backward selection to find 
the variables of statistical significance related 
to the analysis of HCE as a share of GDP in 
the first stage. In the second stage these va-
riables are then used as explanatory variables 
in the dynamic equation on the variable to be 
explained that is the HCE per GDP-share.
For institutional arrangements it has been 
found in previous literature that capitation 
budgeting of GPs and gatekeeping arrange-
ments are cost saving in country comparison 
studies for out-patient level care [14]. The 
same has been found for global budgeting of 
specialized care [15]. More developed DRGs 
in specialized care and/or global hospital 
budgeting may be needed to ensure high 
quality care with cost-control measures in in-
patient care [14,15]. 
Figure 3. Change in selected health indicators, annual %-change, Nordic 
countries, 1970-2005. Source: OECD
years up until 2010 when Finland totaled 8.9 
percent and the OECD average was 9.5. Pu-
blic HCEs have increased both nominally 
and in deflated terms during this period ac-
cording to OECD health policies and infor-
mation by the data division latest bulletin 
outpacing private demand increases [18,20].
Due to ageing population and advances in 
medicine and medical sciences, the costs of 
health care are expected to rise markedly and 
rapidly in OECD countries in the coming ye-
ars in western and developed OECD countri-
es [21]. Health spending per capita averaged 
3268 US$ PPP per capita and increased on 
average across OECD countries by 3.5% in 
2010 data. Public spending on health grew 
even faster, at an average 4.1% in 2009. In 
comparison private spending also continued 
to increase in most countries, but at a slower 
pace. The total HCE spending extremes in 
our data are the USA with 8233 US$ PPP per 
capita and Spain with 3076 US$ PPP per ca-
pita in 2010 [18].
In economic discussion related to health care 
policies the focus is usually on cost and cost-
effectiveness analysis. The benefits of impro-
ved public health through health promotion 
and health care services is relatively much 
harder to measure accurately. Indicators such 
as life expectancy, infant mortality and mea-
sures of morbidity such as disability pensions 
and use of medicine are most commonly 
used.
The effects of health care and health promo-
tion on functional and working capabilities 
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senting each of these groups. This is not an 
easy task and therefore countries with large 
disparities or shortcomings in the OECD data 
period have been omitted. Thus we have the 
10 selected countries for years 1970 to 2005. 
Note that no developing economies, transi-
tional economic countries are present in our 
analysis. The other thing to note is that we 
have included in our data European countries 
(western, mostly EU) and the USA. Therefo-
re the homogeneity of the study data measu-
red by GDP is reinforced. If one looks at the 
details in Paris et al. [16], it is quite obvious 
that pooling of developing and developed 
countries and imposing same econometric 
model structures could and probably would 
be a big mistake.
Our interest in this paper is the point of view 
taken in the research papers by Culyer [19], 
Leu [7] and especially Gerdtham [14,15]. 
They have come to the conclusion that HCE 
costs are not so much dependent on the fi-
nancing sector aspect (state vs. private) but 
on the type as characterized by open ended 
or closed system (public integration, fee-
for-service, global budgeting) or in between 
these two and other key institutional arrange-
ments (capitation, gate-keeping). We estima-
te two dynamic regression models that test 
for the statistical significance of system 
parameters in panel data. The trend growth 
in expenditures is taken into account by in-
cluding a full set of country group dummies 
and time trend.
The idea in this paper is to test and see whe-
ther the incentives to develop and guide the 
services as well as exercise cost-controls 
are best managed in a system where the fi-
nanciers and service providers operate in 
the same contextual framework and struc-
tures (municipality, county, state, third sec-
tor or other organization). In this article it 
is investigated whether the points made 
by Culyer [19] and Leu [7], that closed 
systems may be better for cost-control 
than open ended systems, are valid. As an 
example of closed system one can mention 
Finland and Sweden where outpatient and in-
patient care are publicly financed and delive-
red with a minor (although growing) role for 
co-payments and insurance schemes. On the 
other hand countries such as the Netherlands, 
Switzerland and the USA represent open en-
ded health care systems with multiple source 
(mostly private) financing schemes and mul-
tiple sources service delivery.
According to Leu [7], total HCE increa-
ses with public share of funding of finances 
because the relative price faced by the con-
sumer is heavily subsidized and the budget 
constraint of the individual service user ba-
The following questions and hypothesis are 
to be tested in this article:
1. How do the budgeting and remuneration 
models, i.e. global budgeting (GLO) in 
specialized care and fee-for-service (FFS) 
in primary care, affect health care spen-
ding (HCE)? Are these factors sensitive 
to model selection procedures?
2. How does the public share of health care 
spending affect total spending? And has 
its the impact changed?
3. How do other factors, such as exogenous 
technological change, relative prices of 
health care and the growth of the health 
care profession affect HCE spending?
In this article a dynamic regression model 
is specified to model variation in within and 
between panel data variation of HCE expen-
diture. Nonlinear econometric model of HCE 
expenditure with country and time specific 
adjustment is provided. The model has been 
previously applied to labor demand studies in 
Sweden, Finland and Estonia. However the 
model is applicable to a wide variety of esti-
mation problems where adjustment costs are 
nonlinear and lags of the dependent variable 
are of importance. For further details on me-
thods see [23-25] and Appendix.
In the econometric model the health care fi-
nancing and services structure is captured by 
five indicator (dummy) variables. The FFS-
dummy is a fee-for-service indicator that 
captures the effect of the insurance and co-
payment system by classifying the countries 
in two categories based on fee-for-service po-
licies in outpatient care. The GLO-dummy is 
a global budgeting indicator that captures the 
effect of specialist care hospital budget con-
straint and few channel funding. The CAP-
dummy captures the out-patient capitation 
effect as opposed to salaries or fee-for-ser-
vice. The GATE-dummy does the same for 
gatekeeping in primary care. The PUBINT-
dummy accounts for a closed shop arrange-
ment where the services are provided and 
financed by public authority as opposed to 
contracting or reimbursement arrangements. 
Thus the indicators capture the structure of 
remuneration and financing of health care, 
i.e. the link between health care systems and 
their financing: economic evaluations of glo-
bal budgeting and fee-for-service payment 
systems. To summarize as in Gerdtham [15] 
fee-for-service and non-global budgeting sy-
stem are more open-ended ones. And those 
with capitation accompanied by gatekeeping 
and global budgeting or public integration 
are more closed ones.
As to the data for a reasonable comparison 
of these three groups long time series have 
been obtained for at least one country repre-
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eping in the source population amounted to 
Swfr403-517 (15-19%) per person. Some se-
lection effects were detected but did not sub-
stantially influence this result. Also in Etter’s 
article [29] introduction of gatekeeping and 
budget management by physicians caused a 
favorable self selection process for the uni-
versity plan. In addition, the managed care 
plan achieved a substantial decrease in ove-
rall health care expenditures in its first year 
of operation, chiefly by reducing outlays for 
technical procedures (laboratory tests, physi-
cal therapy, drugs) decreased most in the uni-
versity plan. No impact on hospital admis-
sions was detected.
For an example of HCE growth, the US ba-
sed Medicare and Medicaid insurance poli-
cies have grown in customer fees and insu-
rance premiums considerably in recent years 
(insurance premiums and fees-for-services 
have increased). This might have had a incre-
asing effect on HCE. This has been explained 
in the literature by considerable market po-
wer of providers and the lack of incentives 
to promote cost-controls in health care ser-
vices (OECD 20062 and Altman [26]). The 
same picture is shaping up in the Netherlands 
where insurance companies face oligopoli-
stic markets and find contracting of services 
difficult with respect to quality and incenti-
ves for cost-efficient care. If public providers 
are complained of trying to maximize budget 
shares then it is evident that private providers 
that are quoted in the stock-market have pro-
bably even more incentives for maximizing 
profits and shareholder value. Health care re-
form is an active issue on the political agenda 
in many countries. In the USA the Obama 
health reform plan and its related legislation 
changes have passed Congress by 2010. The-
re are also newly enacted major legislative 
changes in the Netherlands. In the Finnish 
government’s proposal the Health care act is 
to be given to parliament in 2010.
Based on the research literature on country 
comparisons (especially on remuneration and 
financing systems of out-patient care and ho-
spital care). As in Gerdtham [14,15], we esti-
mate nonlinear regression models to test for 
system characteristics effects. What is new 
to previous studies is the flexible functional 
form and adjustment cost considerations that 
2 Health care reform is an active issue on the political agenda 
in many countries. In the Finnish government’s proposal 
the Health care act is to be given to parliament in 2010. 
The reforms will be in place by 2014. The financing models 
in Finland include the capitation, total billing and income 
share models. For specialized care the NordDRG-system 
and billing for GP services to be developed further. This is 
comparable to the Prometheus-model for hospital remu-
neration in the US (Prometheus-models include far more 
than hospital payments).
sed on co-payments, hospital fees and private 
medical costs on pharmaceuticals are highly 
cost-shared by the state. Therefore we inve-
stigate a fee-for-service dummy in primary 
(basic) care and global budgeting in speciali-
zed care system dummy as in Gerdtham [14]. 
Culyer [19] on the other hand points out that 
the financing sector is too passive in fee-for-
service systems and has to rely on asymme-
tric information when making decisions. This 
poses moral hazard problems for the service 
provider. Thus the service provider has less 
incentives for over-care of patients or for 
example grouping higher diagnosis related 
group or DRG-classes than needed (DRG-
drifting). The pay-for-performance schemes 
like diagnosis related groups (DRGs) are 
comparable for example to the Prometheus-
model for hospital remuneration in the US 
[26,27].
The interest is on investigating the effect 
of institutional arrangements or in this case 
financial variables on supply of health care 
services as in Gerdtham [14,15]. The interest 
in this paper is on time period, country and 
regional variations1. We investigate a ga-
tekeeping dummy in the paper among other 
system variables. This awards special atten-
tion for it is found to be a major contributor 
to HCE spending in Gerdtham et al.’s paper 
[14]. Turning to the effects of gatekeeping 
in the Swiss articles by Dreger and Reimers 
[13] and Lehner [28], the characteristics of 
outpatient gatekeeping practices are thorou-
ghly estimated by random trial study designs.
Especially in the article by Lehner [28], the 
characteristics of gatekeeping and fee for 
service beneficiaries were largely similar. 
Unadjusted total costs per person were 8 per-
cent lower in the gatekeeping group. After 
multivariate adjustment, the estimated cost 
savings achieved by replacing fee for servi-
ce based health insurance with gatekeeping 
in the study population amounted to savings 
of 15-19 percent per person in local currency. 
Some selection effects were detected but did 
not substantially influence the result.
In the article by Lehner, Preiswerk et al. [28] 
the characteristics of gatekeeping and fee for 
service beneficiaries were largely similar. 
Unadjusted total costs per person were Sw 
fr231 (8%) lower in the gatekeeping group. 
After multivariate adjustment, the estimated 
cost savings achieved by replacing fee for 
service based health insurance with gateke-
1 In this article the relationships between variables is investi-
gated by means of regression, correlation and descriptive 
analysis that may (but not necessarily) reflect causal rela-
tionships. For a causal effects analysis refer to following 
articles on Swiss health care reform: [28,29].
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induction selection of variables then sub-
stituted as starting values for the nonlinear 
estimation process described by equations 
(5,6,7,8). The derivatives for public funding 
and technological change are as follows
(3) 
(4) 
The nonlinear optimization adjusts both 
equation (2) and (5) in a simultaneous man-
ner taking as “starting values” for optimiza-
tion the OLS-estimates of equation (2). The 
estimation procedure is quite complex and 
presented in SAS language in the Appendix. 
Model for HCE-expenditure is:
(5) 
where 0 ≤ δit ≤ 1 is the parameter for the 
rate (or speed) of adjustment, which in this 
article is modeled by distance or deviation 
from current forecasted expenditures. This 
parameter is the percentage by which the tar-
get variable adjust per year to the change in 
explanatory variables. In the extreme case of 
δit = 1 adjustment is instant and occurs within 
a single time period (in this case year). On 
the other hand if δit = 0, there is no adjustment 
and expenditures follow a stochastic random 
walk process. Because of model structure we 
expect the adjustment parameter to be in the 
interval 0 ≤ δit ≤ 1 but we do not force it to 
be a priori or in estimating results between 
or equal to 0 and 1. Not only in our view, 
but also also according to Kumbhakar [23], 
Piekkola [24] and Heshmati [30], this gives 
flexibility to the specification.
In comparison to many other studies using a 
dynamic model specification the parameter 
δit is a variable to be modeled in the nonlinear 
estimation (in many studies it is assumed that 
the adjustment parameter δit μ = constant for 
all i and t). This brings flexibility as count-
ry specific adjustment is taken into account 
explicitly (note that in our model here the 
adjustment parameter is both flexible in t and 
i dimensions, so for example it can be calcu-
allow for partial adjustment and lagged de-
pendent variables.
METHODS AND DATA
The health care expenditure per Gross dome-
stic product unit (HCE per GDP, PPP, percent 
of GDP) is modeled as a linear combination 
of previous Nit–1 and current expenditure Nit* 
which implies convex adjustment costs on 
average and on the margin. This process is 
often referred to as the adaptive expectations 
model with smooth adjustment. The explana-
tory variables are factors thought to impact 
the variation in the response variable [15]. 
Thus the model equation to be estimated in 
the first stage estimates for iteration is
(1) 
where Nit* is the expected health expenditure 
for country i at time t as a proportion of GDP, 
Xit is the vector of explanatory variables, Zit 
is the indicator variable set, t is the variable 
capturing exogenous technological change 
over time (i.e. time trend variable) and β is 
the vector of parameters to be estimated.
The explanatory variables (see also Table I 
and Table II) in the first stage are the relative 
price index of HCE-expenditure (P), public 
finance share of total expenditure (PF), the 
doctors per population ratio (DOC), the share 
of over 65 year olds of the total population 
(OLD), the urbanization rate (URB), female 
participation rate in the labor market (FEM) 
and a standard time trend (t) to capture other-
wise immeasurable exogenous technological 
change (advances in medicine, etc. time-
variant factors). The model for Nit* (HCE/
GDP) is the specification either as in (2) “full 
model” (Table III) or by OLS-backward se-
lection procedure (“reduced form model”, 
Table IV).
The full model can be written as follows
(2) 
In model (2) all the estimated β parameters 
are in elasticity form as a result of the log-
form of the equation [9,15,25,30]. The model 
for Nit* is estimated by OLS or a backward 
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The nonlinear equation to be estimated is 
presented in equation (5) and the initial va-
lues for the β parameters come from equation 
(2) by standard OLS estimation. The δ para-
meters of equation (5) with the β parameters 
(5) being the subjects of adjustment are then 
estimated by a nonlinear method. Using pa-
nel data these are estimated with a nonlinear 
SAS procedure Nlin (Appendix). The me-
thod used here for nonlinear estimation is the 
Gauss-Newton-iterative method with uit the 
independently identically normal distributed 
error term. As a “round up” one can conclude 
that the new features of the model are the fle-
xibility of adjustment with respect to cross-
sectional as well as time units. The results are 
presented below.
Operationalizing explanatory variables, we 
have the following model variables: public fi-
nancing (PF = the percentage share of public 
financing in health care, % of total HCE), in-
patient share of expenditure (IP = the percen-
tage share of specialized care in health care, 
percent of total HCE), practicing physicians 
per population (DOC, multiplied by 1000), 
the urbanization rate (URB, percent of popu-
lation), exogenous technological change (t), 
(e.g., t is 1 for the first year used, 2 for the 
second year used, etc.), the share of over 65+ 
year olds (OLD, percent of population), the 
relative price index of health care (P, price in-
dex with respect to other goods as estimated 
by OECD) and female labor force participa-
tion rate (FEM, % of 15-64-old women) [15]. 
All these variables were used before begin-
ning that the backwards stepwise procedure 
so the are the full x-set (results in Table III) as 
opposed to the procedure reduced set (Table 
IV).
The GLO- (global hospital budget) and FFS- 
(fee-for-service) variables as well as other 
system indicator variables are described in 
table 1. The expected signs (of elasticity) 
of the dynamic model system dummy coef-
ficients are argued and given in Gerdtham 
[9,14,15]. The fee-for-service has proven 
more costly and global budgeting, gatekee-
ping and capitation remuneration less costly 
than the reference in previous studies with 
OECD data. The system dummies (cap, pu-
bint, FFS and gate) are the indication of such 
arrangement in a particular country and if 
zero then some other arrangement. These are 
the key indicator variables to be estimated, 
tested and reported.
Total HCE expenditures are positively related 
to public finance if the arguments of Gerd-
tham [15], Leu [7], Culyer [19] are valid, 
so equation (3) is expected to be positive in 
sign, EPF > 0. In more urbanized societies the 
transport costs and access to health care are 
lated for Finland for the year, say year 1977, 
or Sweden for the year 2005, and separately 
for all other country & year pairs also) and 
allows for heterogeneity between different 
health care financing strategies and schemes. 
The cyclical fluctuation can also be a poten-
tial factor in adjustment which is allowed by 





The coefficients estimating SAS coding is 
available in the Appendix. The distance from 
optimum defined as the non-negative diffe-
rence between current periods optimum and 
previous periods observed for all i and t va-
lues.
(8) 
The variable dist is generated in the estima-
tion process and reflects the model adjustment 
between past and present forecasted values. 
The larger the deviance the faster the “catch-
up” effect is expected to be. For example if 
health care costs or expenditures have grown 
substantially faster than GDP without major 
changes in health financing structures, the 
age structure, medical technology or me-
dicine costs it can be expected that this is a 
temporary or economic cyclical shock ex-
pected dampen out rather quickly. Thus it is 
expected that δ1 > 0. The other adjustment pa-
rameters have no a priori hypothetical value.
The estimation approach and method used is 
flexible and allows for adjustment over seve-
ral time periods (lags). This takes account of 
the adjustment costs present when policy or 
exogenous variables change. These points of 
view give justification to the model selected 
in equation (5). The limitation is the possi-
bility of co-integration between variables 
which is most often present between HCE 
and GDP series. Here the explanatory varia-
ble (y) is however the ratio between HCE and 
GDP (in percent). Possible omitted variables 
are subsumed into the fixed effects country 
and year specific constant terms.
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cluded the individual country specific dum-
mies are statistically significant. The excep-
tions are Denmark, Switzerland and France 
that do not differ from the reference level 
of Sweden. The lowest level of expenditure 
in this “naïve” model can be found in Spain 
(-32%) and the UK (-30%). On the contrary 
the high level of US expenditure (+25%) is 
clearly evident from the preliminary analysis. 
These results point to the system variation of 
expenditure with the highest levels found in 
more open ended regimes [7,9,19].
The dynamic model is estimated as described 
in the “Research agenda” section. Firstly a 
full model with all explanatory variables is 
estimated using system and country group 
dummies. Due to collinearity the global 
budgeting dummy had to be omitted from 
Table III estimation. The results from this 
regression are presented in Table III. Se-
cond a backward OLS regression procedure 
on equation (2) is used to identify the target 
equation for HCE expenditure and a more 
parsimonious specification. The estimates 
from this equation are then used as starting 
values for the nonlinear Gauss-Newton itera-
tion procedure for the dynamic equation with 
time lag. Now the global budgeting dummy 
is included and other dummies dropped. The 
results of this regression are presented in Ta-
ble IV for model 2.
The reason behind running two models in Ta-
bles III and IV is that we want to check the 
lower, so b
4
 > 0. If inpatient care is more ex-
pensive than outpatient care, then b2 > 0. The 
GP-population ratio is expected to increase 
costs, thus b3 > 0. The effect of exogenous 
technological change is expected to be positi-
ve (advances in medicine and medical scien-
ce, etc. factors), thus TC > 0 and we expect 
parameters b
6,7
 > 0 (see [13]). Also the share 
of elderly population is expected to increase 
costs b
9
 > 0. The effect of female participa-
tion in labor markets is also expected to be a 
positive factor as well, b
10
 > 0, with informal 
home care reductions as a result. However 
we do not have an a priori view of the sign of 
b8 and higher prices may increase or decrease 
costs. By economic reasoning an increase in 
the relative price of health care should reduce 
demand (and lower HCE).
For further reference on variables and defini-
tions see [14,15].
ESTIMATION RESULTS
Two dynamic models with estimation result 
are presented according to the model of the 
“Research agenda” section. with the differen-
ce of two different system dummy sets and 
exogenous variable sets (in Tables III and IV, 
respectively) and based on previous papers 
by Gerdtham [9,15]. A preliminary country 
and time dummy anova type analysis (wi-
thout interaction terms) shows that without 
model structure or explanatory variables in-
Response 
variable (Y)
Y =N = HCE/GDP = health care expenditure as share of Gross domestic product (percentage of GDP)
HCE = health care expenditure (public + private) per capita corrected by Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), 1000 
USD/capita
GDP = gross domestic product corrected by PPP, 1000 USD/capita
Explanatory 
variables (X)
RP = relative price index of health care expenditures
AGE = the relative share of 65 year olds of wrp. working age population, 15-64 year olds
DOC = the ratio of general practitioners wrp. to population, multiplied by 1000
IP = inpatient care as share of total HCE funding (%)
PF = public HCE as share of total HCE (%)
URB = urbanization rate, (percent of urban population)
PRICE = the relative price of health care, index variable
OLD = population aged 65 or over as share of total population
FEM = female participation rate, labor force wrp. to population, 15-64 year olds





GLO = the global budgeting-dummy is a global budgeting indicator that captures the effect of specialist care 
hospital budget constraint and few channel funding. 1 = global budgeting in specialized health care, else =0.
FFS = The fee for service-dummy is a fee for service indicator that captures the effect of the insurance and co-
payment system by classifying the countries in two categories based on fee-for-service policies in outpatient 
care. 1 = outpatient care funded by fee-for-services, else=0
GATE = The gatekeeper-dummy is an indicator variable for observable gatekeeper procedures in primary care 
i.e. need for a referral to specialized care
PUBINT = The public integration-dummy is an indicator of publicly integrated systems (=1) as opposed to 
public contracting or public reimbursement systems (=0)
CAP = The capitation-dummy is an indicator whether doctors are reimbursed according to capitation principle in 
outpatient care (=1) as opposed to salaries or fee-for-service (=0)
Country 
dummies
Countrygroup1 – Finland; Countrygroup2 – Sweden, Denmark, Norway,
Countrygroup3 – Spain, France, Netherlands; Countrygroup4 – United States (US)
Countrygroup5 – United Kingdom (UK); Countrygroup6 - Switzerland
Table I. The model variables of HCE expenditures. Data source: OECD health data 2007 [17].
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sensitivity of the selected model. Therefore 
we include all X-variables in Table III results. 
However the best fit is obtained for the model 
in Table IV that uses backward model selec-
tion in the first stage linear regression equa-
tion (2). This gives the optimization starting 
values for the nonlinear regression parameter 
estimation in equation (5).
In the first stage in model 1. all regressors 
(except global budget dummy) are included. 
In the second phase a backward OLS regres-
sion procedure is used to identify the target 
equation for HCE expenditure and the model 
estimated is model 2. The estimates are in 
both equations from the nonlinear Gauss-
Newton iteration procedure for the dynamic 
equation with one time lag. The adjustment 
parameter is also shown both by system indi-
cators and country groups. This gives validity 
and robustness to the results.3
INTERPRETATION 
AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
The following questions and hypothesis were 
investigated in this article:
1. How do the budgeting and remuneration 
models, i.e. global budgeting (GLO) in 
specialized care and fee-for-service (FFS) 
in primary care, affect health care spen-
ding (HCE)? Are these factors sensitive 
to model selection procedures?
2. How does the public share of health care 
spending affect total spending? And has 
its the impact changed?
3. How do other factors, such as exogenous 
technological change, relative prices of 
health care and the growth of the health 
care profession affect HCE spending?
We answer these question primarily based on 
the econometric models estimated in this pa-
per. The baseline model is the model in Table 
IV. Regarding question 1. from the descrip-
tive and correlation analysis the main fin-
dings point to advantages of the one- or few 
channel financing system (taxes and public 
insurance schemes) with global budgeting 
practices as opposed to the multi-channel 
funding and financing schemes (e.g., private 
insurance schemes with clients co-payments 
and fees-for-service).
From Table III, model 1, we get a hawk’s eye 
view of the overall model although there are 
many statistically insignificant coefficients. 
The fee-for-service and public integration 
system dummies are positive and significant. 
Regarding the elasticities for example the im-
pact of a 10 percent increase of the elderly 
3  The calculations are available from the author upon request.
Year HCE GDP N PF IP DOC URB
1975 430 6,329 75.3 310 57.5 1766 70.6
1980 745 10,041 75.4 542 53.7 1959 72.0
1985 1,088 14,154 74.6 773 51.2 2259 73.4
1990 1,544 18,673 73.4 1072 46.7 2477 74.7
1995 1,958 22,014 73.3 1367 43.1 2660 76.3
2000 2,532 28,475 71.8 1745 38.5 2910 77.6
2005 3,475 34,884 72.9 2433 33.3 3260 79.0
Table II. Averages of key variables used in the model 1975-2005. Source: OECD 













Observations Missing  0
Parameter  Estimate SE  
Mean -5.4934* 0.8212
Public finance share (%) 0.7473* 0.0381
Female partic. rate (%) 0.2044* 0.0601
Urbanization (%) -0.3116 0.1838
GP-rate/pop. -0.1134* 0.0320
Inpatient share (%) 0.0340 0.0261
Elderly share, 65+ (%) 0.1704* 0.0692
Relative price index -0.1614* 0.0463
Exog. tech. change -0.0961* 0.0419
Tech. change **2 -0.1816* 0.0265
FIN indicator 0.0918 0.0856
W-EUR indicator 0.4727* 0.0452
USA indicator 0.7743* 0.0485
UK indicator 0.0165 0.0378













Table III. Model 1. HCE expenditure model with country and system indicators. 
(OECD,1972-2005) with SAS proc nlin-method, Gauss-Newton. NOTES: the table 
shows the country specific effects -b and their standard errors (SE).
p1 = the p-value of a test of joint significance of the coefficients; significance levels –p: * 
p < 0.05; country dummies = p-value of significance test of the country type dummies; 
country group 2 reference: Sweden, Denmark, Norway.
Variable




Public finance share (%) 0.667*** 0.104
Pf-share.* t -0.087 0.052
Female partic. rate (%) -0.163** 0.052
Urbanization (%) 0.839*** 0.084
GP-rate/pop. 0.188*** 0.043
Inpatient share (%) -0.062* 0.029
Exog. tech. change 0.530* 0.220
System indicators
Fee-for-service (FFS) 0.221*** 0.028
Global budget (GLO) -0.343*** 0.051
Adjustment parameter δit 
Mean -0.448*** 0.096
Optimum distance 1.256*** 0.138
FIN indicator -0.215*** 0.055
W-EUR indicator  0.185* 0.083
USA indicator -0.324 0.168
UK indicator 0.096 0.071
SUI indicator 0.096 0.173
Fee-for-service (FFS) 0.417*** 0.088
Global budget (GLO) 0.185* 0.077
Table IV. Model 2. HCE expenditure model with country and 2 key system 
indicators. (OECD,1972-2005) with SAS proc nlin-method, Gauss-Newton, (OLS 
backward selection of variables, 1.stage) Iterations 32, R 9.819E-6, PPC(ccg6) 
0.000099, RPC(ccg6) 0.000152, Object  3.79E-10, Objective0.624276; 
Observations Read 340; Observations 339. NOTES: the table shows the country 
specific effects -b and their standard errors (SE)
p1 = the p-value of a test of joint significance of the coefficients; significance levels –p: * p 
< 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; country dummies = p-value of significance test of the 
country type dummies; time dummies = p-value of a joint significance test of the time fixed 
effects (not shown, all significant at p<0.01-level); country group 2 reference: Sweden, 
Denmark, Norway.
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labor force participation rate has had on the 
contrary had a negative impact on expenditu-
re which was not expected a priori.
The effect of public financing share (PF) on 
total HCE has declined over time from 5% to 
3.5% according to Figure 4. This may point 
to the increased share of private funding but 
also to more cost-effective public use of fi-
nances. According to the data used in this re-
search the private share of health care finan-
cing has indeed grown over time. In Finland 
this is particularly pronounced in occupatio-
nal health care where private services finan-
ced by employers have come to dominate the 
scene.
Thus finally regarding question 3 the impact 
of a 10 percent increase in public financing 
has an 0.5 to 1 percentage point effect on he-
alth care expenditure with respect to GDP. 
This effect has decreased with time which 
may point to better cost control or private 
sector provision of certain services.
share of population has an 1.7% effect on 
health care expenditure with respect to GDP 
and increase of relative prices of health care 
an 1.6% decrease effect.
Turning to the more parsimonious and 
backward induction selected nonlinear Table 
IV, model 2, we make conclusions about the 
two key system variables under review (FFS 
and GLO). The share of public financing, the 
urbanization rate, the share of elderly popu-
lation and the growth of the doctor profes-
sion has had a growth impact on health care 
expenditures per GDP. These impacts are an-
ticipated and in line with previous research. 
The only two unexpected signs in model 2. 
were that of the in-patient share which is cost 
saving and the female labor force participa-
tion rate which had on the contrary had a ne-
gative impact on the model.
From Table IV the indicator variable for a 
fee-for-service system is 22 percent higher 
in costs and the global budgeting indicator is 
34 percent lower in costs as compared to the 
base line reference. By a variation of model 
variables and system dummies the results for 
fee-for-service stay the same, i.e. it is a cost 
increasing remuneration practice. This can be 
seen by looking at Tables III and IV.
As to question 2, the development of expen-
ditures, adjustment parameter and public fi-
nancing share are given in Figure 4. One can 
see that the contribution of national econo-
mic resources devoted to HCE expenditures 
has been on a steady rise since 1975 with 
the exception of the late 1990s based on the 
more parsimonious model 2 results. This re-
sult holds by taking account of the country 
specific variation in the OECD data.
On the other hand the adjustment parameter 
has weakened in strength so the explanato-
ry variables of the target models have lost 
ground to sluggish adjustment making it pos-
sibly more difficult to guide health care sy-
stem’s expenditures in the short run. The ma-
jor obstacles encountered by the US health 
care reform and other countries reforms are 
a showcase for this development. For exam-
ple due to employer arrangements and lack 
of reform in the primary care sector the pri-
vate sector has gained significant foothold in 
occupational health care services in Finland.
The share of public financing (PF), the urba-
nization rate (URB) and the relative growth 
of the doctor (general practitioners, spe-
cialist) profession (DOC) has had a growth 
impact on health care expenditures per GDP. 
These impacts are anticipated and in line with 
previous research. However relative prices or 
ageing (the share of over 65 year olds) did 
not show statistical significance in the “re-
duced” form model (Table IV). The female 
sensitivity of the selected model. Therefore 
we include all X-variables in Table III results. 
However the best fit is obtained for the model 
in Table IV that uses backward model selec-
tion in the first stage linear regression equa-
tion (2). This gives the optimization starting 
values for the nonlinear regression parameter 
estimation in equation (5).
In the first stage in model 1. all regressors 
(except global budget dummy) are included. 
In the second phase a backward OLS regres-
sion procedure is used to identify the target 
equation for HCE expenditure and the model 
estimated is model 2. The estimates are in 
both equations from the nonlinear Gauss-
Newton iteration procedure for the dynamic 
equation with one time lag. The adjustment 
parameter is also shown both by system indi-
cators and country groups. This gives validity 
and robustness to the results.3
INTERPRETATION 
AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
The following questions and hypothesis were 
investigated in this article:
1. How do the budgeting and remuneration 
models, i.e. global budgeting (GLO) in 
specialized care and fee-for-service (FFS) 
in primary care, affect health care spen-
ding (HCE)? Are these factors sensitive 
to model selection procedures?
2. How does the public share of health care 
spending affect total spending? And has 
its the impact changed?
3. How do other factors, such as exogenous 
technological change, relative prices of 
health care and the growth of the health 
care profession affect HCE spending?
We answer these question primarily based on 
the econometric models estimated in this pa-
per. The baseline model is the model in Table 
IV. Regarding question 1. from the descrip-
tive and correlation analysis the main fin-
dings point to advantages of the one- or few 
channel financing system (taxes and public 
insurance schemes) with global budgeting 
practices as opposed to the multi-channel 
funding and financing schemes (e.g., private 
insurance schemes with clients co-payments 
and fees-for-service).
From Table III, model 1, we get a hawk’s eye 
view of the overall model although there are 
many statistically insignificant coefficients. 
The fee-for-service and public integration 
system dummies are positive and significant. 
Regarding the elasticities for example the im-
pact of a 10 percent increase of the elderly 
3  The calculations are available from the author upon request.
Year HCE GDP N PF IP DOC URB
1975 430 6,329 75.3 310 57.5 1766 70.6
1980 745 10,041 75.4 542 53.7 1959 72.0
1985 1,088 14,154 74.6 773 51.2 2259 73.4
1990 1,544 18,673 73.4 1072 46.7 2477 74.7
1995 1,958 22,014 73.3 1367 43.1 2660 76.3
2000 2,532 28,475 71.8 1745 38.5 2910 77.6
2005 3,475 34,884 72.9 2433 33.3 3260 79.0
Table II. Averages of key variables used in the model 1975-2005. Source: OECD 













Observations Missing  0
Parameter  Estimate SE  
Mean -5.4934* 0.8212
Public finance share (%) 0.7473* 0.0381
Female partic. rate (%) 0.2044* 0.0601
Urbanization (%) -0.3116 0.1838
GP-rate/pop. -0.1134* 0.0320
Inpatient share (%) 0.0340 0.0261
Elderly share, 65+ (%) 0.1704* 0.0692
Relative price index -0.1614* 0.0463
Exog. tech. change -0.0961* 0.0419
Tech. change **2 -0.1816* 0.0265
FIN indicator 0.0918 0.0856
W-EUR indicator 0.4727* 0.0452
USA indicator 0.7743* 0.0485
UK indicator 0.0165 0.0378













Table III. Model 1. HCE expenditure model with country and system indicators. 
(OECD,1972-2005) with SAS proc nlin-method, Gauss-Newton. NOTES: the table 
shows the country specific effects -b and their standard errors (SE).
p1 = the p-value of a test of joint significance of the coefficients; significance levels –p: * 
p < 0.05; country dummies = p-value of significance test of the country type dummies; 
country group 2 reference: Sweden, Denmark, Norway.
Variable




Public finance share (%) 0.667*** 0.104
Pf-share.* t -0.087 0.052
Female partic. rate (%) -0.163** 0.052
Urbanization (%) 0.839*** 0.084
GP-rate/pop. 0.188*** 0.043
Inpatient share (%) -0.062* 0.029
Exog. tech. change 0.530* 0.220
System indicators
Fee-for-service (FFS) 0.221*** 0.028
Global budget (GLO) -0.343*** 0.051
Adjustment parameter δit 
Mean -0.448*** 0.096
Optimum distance 1.256*** 0.138
FIN indicator -0.215*** 0.055
W-EUR indicator  0.185* 0.083
USA indicator -0.324 0.168
UK indicator 0.096 0.071
SUI indicator 0.096 0.173
Fee-for-service (FFS) 0.417*** 0.088
Global budget (GLO) 0.185* 0.077
Table IV. Model 2. HCE expenditure model with country and 2 key system 
indicators. (OECD,1972-2005) with SAS proc nlin-method, Gauss-Newton, (OLS 
backward selection of variables, 1.stage) Iterations 32, R 9.819E-6, PPC(ccg6) 
0.000099, RPC(ccg6) 0.000152, Object  3.79E-10, Objective0.624276; 
Observations Read 340; Observations 339. NOTES: the table shows the country 
specific effects -b and their standard errors (SE)
p1 = the p-value of a test of joint significance of the coefficients; significance levels –p: * p 
< 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; country dummies = p-value of significance test of the 
country type dummies; time dummies = p-value of a joint significance test of the time fixed 
effects (not shown, all significant at p<0.01-level); country group 2 reference: Sweden, 
Denmark, Norway.
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bles effects to Roberts’ findings [10]. Incre-
ases in public financing share and advances 
in technology seem to drive up costs (Tables 
III and IV). This is also the case for the ur-
banization rate in the parsimonious model of 
Table IV.
As for the main health care organizational re-
sults (the dummy z-variables controlling for 
continues x-variables) are that the indicator 
variable for a fee-for-service system is 22 
percent higher in costs and the global bud-
geting indicator is 34 percent lower in costs 
as compared to the base line reference. This 
is reflected in good cost-control performan-
ce of the global budgeting schemes in health 
care. Cost-control in health care services may 
require GP’s to be publicly employed or clo-
sely regulated gatekeepers to prevent leaka-
ges from primary to specialized care. There 
is solid evidence on this in the Swiss health 
care sector [28,29].
So, according to our findings globally bud-
geted systems with salaried (or capitation) 
physicians do well in comparison the more 
open-ended financing schemes. Examples of 
such are health care services that rely on fee-
for-service based remuneration as opposed to 
capitation based or salaried GPs.
The results point to the fact that cost-controls 
in health care services may require GP’s to be 
publicly employed or closely regulated priva-
te sector gatekeepers to prevent moral hazard 
and leakages from primary to specialized 
care [9]. There seem to be incentives to over-
produce (moral hazard) when the remunera-
tion system is volume compensation based 
(FFS). On the contrary framework (global) 
budgeting was found less expensive in inter-
national comparison. The public integrated 
According to Leu [7] view total HCE increa-
ses with public share of funding (PF) of finan-
ces because the relative price faced by the 
consumer is heavily subsidized and the budget 
constraint of the individual service user based 
on co-payments, hospital fees and private me-
dical costs on pharmaceuticals are cost-sha-
red. Culyer [19] on the other hand points out 
that the financing sector is too passive in fee-
for-service systems (FFS) and has to rely on 
asymmetric information when making deci-
sions. Therefore fee-for-service is relatively 
more expensive than other systems. These 
previous research going in the same direction 
as our findings may partly explain our results.
DISCUSSION
We discuss here the results of Tables III and 
IV. The results of these tables can be compa-
red and analyzed side by side. The model 1 in 
Table III is the full or unrestricted model that 
has the long run optimum equation based on 
variables suggested by Gerdtham [9,14,15]. 
The more parsimonious model of Table IV 
was selected based on backward induction of 
the originally proposed long-run model (used 
in Table III) [9]. It was found during estima-
ting different dynamic model specifications 
that the time trend (exogenous technology) 
made the estimates somewhat sensitive to 
model specification. The best models with 
smooth adjustment were selected into Tables 
III and IV based on speed of convergence to 
optimum in maximum likelihood (ML) va-
lues and stability of estimates to slight speci-
fication changes.
The system dummy effects are similar to 
Gerdtham [14,15] and the exogenous varia-
Figure 4. Health care expenditure in sample by 1.GDP-share (right, pp.), 2. adjustment, 3. public finance share /left, %)
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contracted, public reimbursed, or more priva-
te systems. This reinforces the point made by 
Gerdtham [9,14,15], Culyer [19], and Leu [7] 
that the financing source or provider sector 
(the shares of public-private mix) is not so 
important as are the economic incentive ar-
rangements on the out-patient and in-patient 
levels in hospitals and primary care units.
Indeed there are reforms under way (for exam-
ple in the UK, USA or Finland) that aim at 
increasing the “bottom to top” incentives and 
decisions instead of the usual “top to down” 
processes [31]. The Obama administration he-
alth reforms are also under way. The situation 
is quite similar in Finland where new health 
care legislation was enacted in May of 2011. 
Patient choice, quality of care and economic 
incentives are in many cases top of the agen-
da. The outcomes and costs of these reforms 
are thus far mostly unclear. More research on 
the questions of system characteristics and 
especially economic incentives of financiers 
and service providers is thus needed.
APPENDIX
SAS-program for estimating results in Ta-
bles III and IV health care expenditure model 
(copyright: Eero Siljander, THL, Finland):
proc nlin data=health12 method=gauss 
outest=bols2 maxiter=1000;
/* note parms could also be from saved file of 
OLS estimates that is used in table 4. model 
2. */
/* parms set to zero for nonlinear optimazi-
tion in table 3. model 1. */
parms b0 0 blogpubshare 0 bpublictrend 0 
blogfemale 0 blogurbanization 0
blogphysician 0 bloginpatient 0 bold 0 
blogprice 0
bFFSdummy 0 bGLOdummy 0 bGATEdum-
my 0 bPUBdummy 0 bCAPdummy 0
btrend 0 btrend2 0 bcg1 0 bcg3 0 bcg4 0 bcg5 
0 bcg6 0 btrend 0 bcg1 0
bcg3 0 bcg4 0 bcg5 0 bcg6 0
c0 0 cdist 0 ccg1 0 ccg3 0 ccg4 0 ccg5 0 ccg6 
0 cFFSdummy 0 cGLOdummy 0
cGATEdummy 0 cCAPdummy 0 cPUB-
dummy 0 ctrend 0 ctrend2 0 cpublictrend 0 
clogpubshare 0 ;
/* the optimum (long run) model ------*/









system was found to be more expensive than 
public reimbursement and other finance as in 
the previously mentioned literature. The re-
sults for gatekeeper-practice (referral of a GP 
needed to go to a specialist) and capitation 
remuneration (size of the population the GP 
is responsible of and gives medical services) 
were not statistically significant here (as was 
the significant case consistently in [9]).
A cautionary note on results is that the qua-
lity of data could be somewhat better. There 
are some problems with unified definitions 
of variables and accounting standards across 
countries in the OECD health data (also 
some replacement of missing values by data 
source). Whether these are bigger or smaller 
problems is a matter of research evaluation. 
Another matter for same kind of issues could 
be somewhat weak theoretical background of 
explanatory variables used in the optimum 
(long run) equation in (2) [9]. Of minor is-
sues the sample size was adequate for our 
study and the rigidity of the coefficient struc-
ture was significantly relaxed in our research.
As a general discussion one can say based on 
latest OECD statistics on HCE-GDP ratios 
the Nordic countries that Great Britain and 
Spain (that have NHS type or public integra-
ted systems) seem to do well in containing 
HCE costs. Global budgeting (and DRGs) 
are used in all these countries, fees-for-ser-
vice are not primarily used in basic health 
care, and all these countries rely mostly on 
public financing of services (taxes, social in-
surance). However public integration in these 
countries may not be less costly than public 
reimbursement or public contracting arrange-
ments (see [9,14]).
There are cost pressures evident in more pri-
vate oriented systems that have led for exam-
ple Switzerland to introduce tougher GP-
gatekeeper measures and global budgeting in 
Swiss health insurance plans. They have been 
cost-control effective according to research. 
The NHS in the UK has introduced the NICE 
center for evaluating care and for counting 
the health economic effects and cost-effec-
tiveness of various practices. In Finland the 
Centre for Health and Social Economics – 
CHESS (at National institute for health and 
welfare) has begun similar work in recent 
years. Health care reform, cost control, cost-
efficiency are active and growing issues on 
the political agenda in many (especially we-
stern) OECD-countries with fast ageing po-
pulations.
Commissioning of services and purchaser-
provider may be more cost-efficient than 
exclusive public delivery. In our study the 
results show that publicly integrated systems 
are more costly in the long run than public 
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/* the unrestricted dist variable in adjustment 
parameter equation */
dist = abs(lstar-lgl);
/* the dynamic partial adjustment model */
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